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Abstract: Using a sample of 4,278 listed UK firms, we construct a social network of directorship-
interlocks that comprises 31,495 directors. We use social capital theory and techniques
developed in social network analysis to measure a director’s connectedness and investigate
whether this connectedness is associated with their compensation level and their firms overall
performance. We find connectedness is positively associated with compensation and with the
firm’s future performance. The results do not support the view that executive and outside
directors use their connections to extract economic rents. Rather the company compensates
these individuals for the resources these better connections provide to the firm.
Keywords: corporate governance, compensation, board of directors, social networks, corporate
performance
1. INTRODUCTION
Since 2001, there has been increased attention by the media, politicians, and aca-
demics on what appears to be overly generous levels of executive compensation
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). One area of research focuses on whether an executive’s so-
cial network, and in particular those of chief executive officers (CEOs), are associated
with generous compensation packages (Larcker et al., 2005; Barnea and Guedj, 2007;
Brown et al., 2008; andHwang and Kim, 2011). This prior literature mainly investigates
the implications of director ties on the firm’s corporate governance, focusing on the
potential costs of connections by identifying specific ties between certain individuals
that are considered more likely to create agency problems for the firm. But are
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executive’s and outsider director’s connections in general always costly for a firm or
are there benefits to such ties? The social capital literature suggests that connections
do have potential benefits as they create social networks and these networks facilitate
access to a broader source of information at a lower cost, and improve its quality,
relevance and timeliness (Adler and Kwon, 2002). For example, Useem (1984) noted
director-interlocks enable managers to achieve an optimal ‘business scan’ of the latest
business practices and overall business environment.
Using this initial insight we examine whether the connectedness of executives
and outside directors in general provides their respective firms with informational
resources or merely provides the individuals with ‘managerial power’ which they can
wield against their firm for their own personal gain. This paper therefore distinguishes
itself from others in the literature as we do not take a purely monitoring stance
to the issue of connectedness by only focusing on ties between specific individuals.
Rather we investigate the potential value of a director’s overall connectedness —
which is generated through their position in the UK network of interlocking cor-
porate directorships — from both an individual and firm perspective. Specifically,
we investigate (a) whether ‘better’ connected executives and outside directors are
remunerated for their connectedness and (b) whether the aggregate connectedness
of these individuals provides useful resources to the firm and thereby improves the
firm’s future performance.
To examine how an executive’s or outside director’s connections relates to their
compensation level and, collectively, to their firm’s overall performance, we use social
capital theory (Burt, 2005). Social capital theory has developed specific theoretical
mechanisms and measures that explain how an individual’s level (or collectively on
a firm level) of connectedness contributes to their access to information, ability to
coordinate actions, and efficacy as a monitoring agent. Focusing on director inter-
locks, we construct various measures of connectedness using techniques developed in
social network analysis (SNA). Our findings indicate that the better an executive’s or
outside director’s connectedness, the higher her compensation. This finding suggests
that either the executives and outside directors are rewarded for providing valuable
resources to their firms (via their connections), or are rewarded with ‘managerial
power’ provided by their connections, which creates opportunities to extract economic
rents in the form of ‘pay-without-performance’ (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).
To distinguish between these two explanations, we investigate the relation between
the connectedness of the firm, as a whole created through the collective ties of its
board members, and the firm’s future performance. We find that the firm’s executive
and outsider director’s aggregate connectedness is positively associated with the firm’s
future performance. These findings suggest that the executives and outside directors
are not only rewarded for the resources their connections bring to the firm, but also
that these aggregate resources are associated with superior firm performance. All the
findings hold when we include several control variables to proxy for the executives’
and outside directors’ individual ‘human capital’. This is especially important since
the concept of social capital (‘connectedness’) and human capital have clear parallels,
although they are not identical.
Although we only focus on observable (formal) ties, the social capital literature
does suggest that social (informal) ties and formal ties such as interlocking board
directorships typically complement each other (Hwang and Kim, 2011) and frequently
amplify the effects of different types of ties. Informal social ties such as the ones based
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on club memberships or membership of philanthropic organizations are regarded
as venues where newcomer board members can be introduced to norms and values
of corporate boards. Westphal et al. (2006) suggest that ties based on interlocking
board memberships have effects similar to informal social ties. These interlocking
directorships, in addition to being assets in their own right reflect, in the corporate
realm, the directors’ existing social ties.
It is important to note that, although a director (and collectively a firm) may be able
to choose who they are directly connected to, the actual network position resulting
from these connections e.g., ‘connectedness’ is dependent not only on the individual’s
director connections, but also on who their connections are also connected to. Thus,
an individual cannot directly have control over their connectedness, but can only
increase the probability of gaining a desirable network position.1 Furthermore, we
assume that the market for directors is not a single market, but a collection of partially
overlapping markets. Some of the companies, typically in the same industries, compete
for the same candidates, but, as a whole, the pool of directors is not universal.
Therefore, there is not a single point of equilibrium and there is not a single price
(compensation) that would clear the market.2 Hence, different boards would be look-
ing at different network positions in accordance to which they offer compensation.
Also, since the network is composed of partially-overlapping markets, no single board
is fully aware of the entire network. We do expect boards to have knowledge of their
‘neighbouring’ boards, that is, boards with which they share directors or other boards
in the same industry. However, better-connected directors are likely to be more visible
to the board. Thus, although boards may not be aware of the entire network, public
visibility may serve as a proxy for high levels of connectedness.
Our paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, we provide
empirical evidence, for the first time to the best of our knowledge, that the better-
connected an executive or outside director is, the greater the benefits to the firm.
Thus, better-connected firms generate superior future performance. Moreover, the
firms appear to acknowledge the value of these resources and compensate the
individuals for them. Unlike previous studies on compensation and individual ties,
we are able to infer that connectedness is beneficial to a firm and does not necessarily
result in managerial power for the individual.
Second, we use the entire population of UK listed firms to construct a network, and
we rely on social capital theory to identify which executives and outside directors have
the most valuable network resources e.g., who is ‘better’ connected. By employing
social capital theory and using measures from social network analysis, our paper
bridges multiple disciplines of research and introduces social ties in general as a new
determinant of compensation and firm performance. Thus, we present social network
analysis as a useful tool that researchers can use to examine social connections in large
scale analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline the theory of social capital
and describe the social network variables we use in this study. In Section 3 we discuss
1 Social capital is ‘located’ not in individuals but in their relations with other individuals (Adler and Kwon,
2002). No one individual has exclusive ownership rights to social capital. If you or your partner in the
relationship withdraws, the connection dissolves with whatever social capital is contained (Burt, 1992, p.58).
2 For example, company A may see directors 1, 2 and 3 as potential candidates for a director’s position.
Company B may see directors 3, 4 and 5 as candidates. There is competition between A and B over the pay
offered to director 3, but not over the other directors they consider.
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the prior literature and present our hypotheses. Section 4 presents our sample and
describes our research design. Section 5 presents the results and several sensitivity
tests. Section 6 concludes.
2. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SOCIAL NETWORK MEASURES
Social capital is a concept that has attracted the attention of scholars who seek to
explain how individuals mobilize their resources through relationships with others
(Adler and Kwon, 2002; and for a review see Burt, 2001). The concept is based on
the notion that the actions of individuals are greatly facilitated by their membership
in social networks. Therefore, social capital can help explain the differential success
of individuals and firms in their competitive environments (Adler and Kwon, 2002).
As Burt (2000) notes, social capital is a metaphor for advantage: people who do
better in business are better-connected in one way or another. For example, research
shows that social ties help individuals (firms) gain access to information about job
opportunities (potential employees) (Burt, 1992; and Fernandez et al., 2000), new
innovations (Burt, 1987), and provide a finer grained information set (Uzzi, 1997).
More recently, researchers began to apply notions from social capital theory and social
networks analysis to the examination of financial networks in areas such as patterns of
inter-bank lending (Godlewski et al., 2012), investment behaviour of venture capitalists
(Hochberg et al., 2007) and the relation between board memberships and funds’
return (Cohen et al., 2008).
Although research shows that social capital plays a central role in determining
individual sets of opportunities, human capital is also related to this process. Human
capital refers to the skills and abilities that an individual possesses. For example, a
degree from a leading university may help a person secure a desirable job. However,
once in that job, the person would benefit from the connections the job brings with it.
In other words, human capital is converted, at least in part, into social capital. This is
consistent with the saying ‘it is not what you know, but who you know’. Moreover, such
‘conversion’ is also possible in the opposite direction (e.g., a person can now apply for
an even better job, building on the knowledge they obtained in a previous job). We
are aware that social and human capital is deeply intertwined in people’s biographical
history. However, by focusing on the social networks in which people are embedded at
given points in time, we capture the social capital manifestation of both human and
social dimensions.
In essence, networks are simply information channels, they do not replace infor-
mation so much as they affect the flow of information and what people or firms
can do with it (Burt, 2000). Network participants are not simultaneously aware of
the information within the network; communication takes time so the connections
between individuals affect who knows what and when. Even if the information is of a
high quality, and eventually reaches everyone, the fact that diffusion takes time means
that individuals with greater social capital are informed early or more broadly and thus
have an advantage.
To examine the relevance of social capital theory to compensation and firm
performance, we construct a complete interlocking-directorship network that includes
not only the direct ties between one executive or outside director and another, but also
the indirect ties, those that are generated by a friend of a friend. In this network we
draw on social capital theory to determine which connections are ‘better’. We measure
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two forms of connectedness: closeness centrality which we refer to as ‘closeness’, and
aggregate dyadic constraint which we refer to as ‘brokerage position’. In the Appendix
we provide a detailed description of how these measures are calculated.
Closeness captures the centrality of the executive or outside director and reflects
how near that individual is to all others in the social network. It is defined as the inverse
of the shortest path between an individual and all other individuals reachable from it,
and measures how close an actor is to all other actors or how central the actor is in
the network, after taking into account the centrality of all the other actors. Closeness
therefore refers to how efficiently and effectively the individual can communicate
with others by either communicating directly or through intermediaries. Taking into
account the size of the network, a director with high closeness can quickly transmit and
receive information. The shorter the social distance of an individual from others in the
network, the higher the quality of information available to that individual: information
is going to pass through fewer intermediaries and therefore arrive sooner and be
more accurate and detailed. This is particularly important since information quality
deteriorates as it moves from one person to the next in a chain of intermediaries.
Such an individual can access resources more easily, monitor the information flow
more effectively, and have a better view of the activity in the network (Freeman, 1980).
Closeness is a holistic measure, as it incorporates the aggregate impact of the entire
network on the potential strengths and weaknesses embedded in each of the directors’
positions.
Our second measure of connectedness is dyadic constraint (‘brokerage position’).
It quantifies the degree to which the executive or outside director can serve as an
effective broker in a network. The lower the executive’s dyadic constraint, within her
network of connections, the more likely she is to serve effectively as a broker. Thus, a
good brokerage position is negatively related to the dyadic constraint. Burt (1992)
developed dyadic constraint by building on Granovetter (1973 and 1974) studies,
which are based on the idea that a person can benefit from serving as a link between
two or more otherwise disconnected or loosely connected groups in a network. Burt
(2005) labels such positions as ‘structural holes’ and suggests that individuals who
bridge these holes are in a brokerage position, have access to a wider diversity of
information, early access to that information, and more control over information
diffusion. On the contrary, those individuals with a constrained network position (i.e.,
no structural holes, where everyone is highly interconnected) have redundant ties,
which lowers the potential efficacy of those ties (Burt, 2005). For example, if director
A is interlocked with director B and director C, then that connection would be less
effective for director A if directors B and C are also interlocked, because A is more
likely to receive similar information from both B and C. In addition, redundancy in an
individual’s connections can also constrain his or her actions, because information on
such actions flows in paths that are not independent of the person’s direct influence
(e.g., B and C can exchange information about A).
These two measures depict different dimensions of an individual’s connectedness.
While closeness measures how accessible information is to the individual, brokerage
position measures to what degree that information gives her relative advantage over
her network neighbors. Overall, these measures capture the idea that being better-
connected is not about how many people an individual is directly connected to but
more about the quality of those connections e.g., who her connections are connected
to.
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All the informational advantages of connectedness discussed above can also be
applied to the firm level. Certainly one can argue that a firm establishes connections
through their inter-connected directors. In other words, the network position of a
firm’s individual directors collectively yields a network position for the firm. Or alter-
natively, the sum of the individuals’ social capital represents the stock of social capital
of an organization (Burt, 2005). We therefore measure the closeness (brokerage)
position of each firm by aggregating the closeness (brokerage) for each director within
the firm.
Although one cannot choose a specific network position, a director can increase
the likelihood of a better position in terms of closeness by serving on a board where
there are already highly visible directors, given the argument above about visibility and
connectedness. To increase the likelihood of a better position in terms of brokerage,
a director would choose to serve on more than one board of a company that do not
share directors with one another or are in different industries. In so doing, the director
would increase the chance that by sitting on these boards, he or she would connect
previously unconnected areas of the network and thus be in a beneficial brokerage
position.
3. PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
Because executives and outside directors perform different roles within an organiza-
tion, it is possible that ‘connectedness’ might have different resource benefits and
for this reason will be valued very differently by the firm. This is especially important
to consider given the variation of outside director compensation within and across
firms here in the UK.3 Hence, we present the corresponding literature and hypothesis
separately for executive and outside directors.
(i) CEOs and Other Executive Officers
There are currently two views regarding corporate executive pay. One view argues
that CEOs’ pay follows a well-executed pay-for-performance model (Kay and Van
Putten, 2007). The second view suggests that rising executive pay is unrelated to firm
performance (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). These authors argue that executive officers
can exert power and influence the decision control function of outside directors
in relation to their compensation. According to this power hypothesis, the more
power executives exert, the higher the compensation they receive and the more they
expropriate wealth from shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).
Most of the prior literature examines CEO compensation under a variety of cor-
porate governance structures. The results suggest that firms with weaker governance
structures pay their CEOs more (Conyon and Peck, 1998; and Core et al., 1999).
These authors find that CEO compensation is higher when the board is larger; the
proportion of outside directors appointed during the CEO tenure increases; and when
the board includes CEO interlocking directorships (Hallock, 1997).
Recent work has investigated whether CEOs’ social connections are associated with
large compensation packages. For example, Larcker et al. (2005) find that CEOs
3 In the UK there is no maximum threshold for outside director pay. It is very common for directors within
a firm to receive different levels of pay. Whilst in the US a fixed fee for outside directorships is very common.
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are able to extract economic rents when they have links with directors who serve
on the board’s compensation committee. Main et al. (1995) find that compensation
committees whose chairs are appointed after the CEO takes office tend to award
higher CEO compensation. Barnea and Guedj (2007) find that firms whose directors
have high centrality tend to award their CEOs with higher compensation, although
the compensation is less sensitive to firm performance. Hwang and Kim (2011) find
that socially dependent boards in which the outside directors have social ties to the
CEO offer higher pay levels to their CEOs. Brown et al. (2008) find that the social ties
CEOs form over their corporate careers are positively related to their compensation
and inversely related to pay-performance sensitivity. All these results suggest that the
connectedness of executives has important implications for the efficacy of corporate
governance.
If the executive’s remuneration is efficiently priced and connections provide the
executive with resources that enable her to be a better decision manager, then the
more valuable these resources are to the firm and the higher will be her compensation.
Alternatively, if executives’ connections provide them with managerial power, then
executives might be able to extract economic rent by influencing the board and
negotiating a more favorable remuneration package. Both scenarios suggest that
executives who have high levels of closeness and a better brokerage position earn
higher levels of compensation. Thus, our first hypothesis is:
H1: An executive officer’s compensation level is positively associated with her close-
ness and brokerage position.
(ii) Outside Directors
From a corporate governance perspective, outside directors and interlocking director-
ships perform two functions (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). First, boards use outside
directors to enhance the monitoring of management on behalf of the sharehold-
ers (Fama and Jensen, 1983), and therefore reduce agency costs and improve a
firm’s performance (Fama, 1980; and Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Second, outside
directors provide resources to the firm (Johnson et al., 1996). For example, board
members can serve as ‘boundary spanners’ (Zahra and Pearce, 1989) who provide
access to communication channels with the external environment. Such board mem-
bers provide their firm with access to new information (Allen, 1974). These resources
can, in turn, help reduce dependencies between the firm and external contingencies,
enhance organizational legitimacy (Zahra and Pearce, 1989), reduce uncertainty
(Pfeffer, 1972), and lower transaction costs (Williamson, 1984). Thus, these resources
impact firm decision making (Mizruchi, 1996) and improve a company’s performance
and solvency (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988).
Given these findings, social capital theory provides an ideal framework for examin-
ing what determines a firm’s demand for outside directors, and ultimately, the level of
their compensation. If outside directors can use their connections to become better
monitors, then the better the monitoring an outside director provides, the higher is
her compensation. Prior research finds that outside directors who hold a more central
position in their network of inter-board connections and who show a high brokerage
position provide legitimacy, which improves the status of the firm (Davis and Greve,
1997); links the firm to other important entities (Hillman et al., 2001); facilitates access
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to outside financing (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988; and Johnson et al., 1996); helps
in strategic decision making (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989); and provides information,
expertise, and advice (Westphal, 1999).
Whether or not outside directors with high levels of closeness and brokerage
position are more capable monitors is not clear. Individuals in such positions are likely
to have an informational advantage over others, and are more likely to be experienced
and highly reputable. Therefore, if they utilize their information advantages and if
they are willing to risk their reputations, then they might provide effective monitoring
of the firm’s executive layer. However, by occupying central locations in their social
networks, it might be difficult for them to serve as effective monitors of others to whom
they are either directly or in some other way very closely connected (Barnea and Guedj,
2007; and Larcker et al., 2005). As Powell and Smith-Doerr (1997) note ‘ . . . the ties
that bind may also be the ties that blind’. Alternatively, by having more connections,
outside directors might become even more independent because they are less reliant
on any single firm for their compensation and social connections. These connections
can motivate them to be more independent and better capable of, for example, raising
an independent voice at board meetings. Thus, such outside directors can serve as
more effective monitors.
Even if the connections of outside directors enable them to become better moni-
tors, this better monitoring might not lead directly to higher levels of compensation.
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that many outside directors are either executives or
important decision agents in other organizations, and that they use their outside
directorships to signal their reputation as experts in decision control. Consequently,
they are much more focused on the reputational effects than on salary. Fama and
Jensen (1983) suggest that such signals are only credible when the direct payments
to outside directors are small. Under this scenario, a negative relation would exist
between outside directors’ compensation and their closeness and brokerage position.
Therefore, we write a non-directional hypothesis, as follows:
H2: An outside director’s compensation level is associated with her closeness and
brokerage position.
(iii) A Firm’s Connectedness and Future Profitability
The existing literature suggests that if a director’s connectedness generates useful
resources then collectively these resources will be associated to the firm’s profitability.
For example, Haunschild and Beckman (1998) find that a director’s connectedness
provides information which influences the strategic choices of firms. A firm whose
individuals are more central to the network will have more opportunities to access
all network information, and access it in a timelier manner. For example, the firm
will have better access to the latest business practices and have a better view of the
overall business environment. Barr (2000) finds that social capital in the form of
social relationships embedded within bounded institutional or diffused community
structures influences economic performance. This is partly because such networks
facilitate the flow of technical information and knowledge that helps reduce economic
transition costs as well as serve as crucial input in the production process. Fernandez
et al. (2000) measured the ‘instrumental’ value to a firm of its employees’ social
network. Within the context of a large US customer service call center, the authors
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find that the firm’s social capital investments (reflected in the $250 referral bonus
given to current employees for each successful hire who lasted through a specified
time period) resulted in gathering a ‘net benefit’ through the firm’s acquiring a ‘richer
pool’ of candidates.
Likewise, if connectedness of an outside director enables her to increase her
efficacy as a monitoring agent then the firm’s agency costs will also decrease and
potentially the firm’s performance will improve. Consequently, we would expect to see
a positive association between a firm’s connectedness and the firm’s current and future
performance. Unless the profitability or valuation of the company already reflects the
benefits coming from the resources provided by its executives and outside directors,
then the future performance will be unrelated to these services, after controlling for
current performance.
In addition, given our definition of rent extraction as a situation whereby the
director’s compensation is positively correlated with their network measures, but not
with future performance of the company (controlling for current performance). Our
regression model focuses on this definition and tests if these conditions exist. If
better-connected executives and outside directors receive higher compensation partly
because their connections provide them with opportunities to extract economic rents,
then the association between the firm’s connectedness and its future performance will
be negative. If this is not the case then we can rule out rent extraction. Thus, our third
hypothesis is:
H3: The firm’s closeness or brokerage position is associated with its future performance.
4. SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN
(i) Sample
Our sample consists of nearly all the UK companies on the London Stock Exchange
(LSE) that are listed on either the Main or the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)
between 2000 and 2007. We obtain executive and outside director’s compensation data
mainly from Hemscott, with other completions from BoardEx, and all stock market
and accounting data from DataStream and Worldscope.
To calculate the network measures for each individual, we construct a complete
interlocking-director network that comprises 4,278 firms, 31,495 directors,4 and
111,114 directorship-years.5 After excluding observations with missing or zero com-
pensation, the final sample for the econometric analysis contains 3,332 firms, 21,970
directors, and 76,241 directorship-years (see Table 1).6 The firms are from a wide range
of industries and vary significantly in terms of size; firms range from a market value of
£100 million to a market value of £158 billion.
We obtain compensation data for each executive and outside director from
Hemscott. Hemscott calculates total compensation as the sum of salary, bonus, stock
options, pension benefits, and other benefits. Because Hemscott excludes compensa-
tion from long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) that are widely used in the UK instead
of stock option schemes, we obtain data on LTIPs from BoardEx. However, after
4 Director in this paper is used as a collective term to describe both executive officers and outside directors.
5 All 31,495 directors are connected to each other (directly or indirectly), in one or more of the years.
6 See the Appendix for details about the calculation of network measures.
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Table 1
Sample and Firm Descriptive Statistics
Unique Unique Director-
Measure Companies Directors Firm-Year
Network measures 4,278 31,495 111,114
Excluding missing or zero
compensation
946 9,525 34,873
Analysis sample 3,332 21,970 76,241
Standard
Mean Deviation Q3 Median Q1
Average firm closeness 0.087 0.049 0.120 0.105 0.078
Average firm brokerage 0.662 0.226 0.830 0.674 0.533
position
Market Value of equity
(£’m)
953 6,146 236 48 12
Stock return 16.0% 82.0% 30.0% 3.0% −22.0%
Sales growth 12.0% 47.0% 21.0% 9.0% −2.0%
ROA −4.0% 22.0% 6.0% 2.0% −3.0%
MTB 2.51 5.44 2.68 1.35 0.86
% Outsider directors 57.5% 23.5% 71.4% 57.1% 42.9%
% Busy directors 12.4% 33.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Notes:
The number of companies, directors, and observations used in constructing the network measures
and the number of companies, directors and observations used in the final analysis. In addition the statistics
for the final company sample. Firm closeness is the sum of the firm’s executive and outside director’s
individual closeness. Closeness is our measure of how long it will take information to spread from a given
vertex to other reachable vertices in the network. The measure is normalized and ranges from zero to
one. Firm brokerage position is the sum of the firm’s executive and outside director’s individual brokerage
position. We measure brokerage position by using the dyadic constraint which we minus from one. The
dyadic constraint measures the redundancy of a director’s ties. The measure is normalized and ranges
from zero to one. A higher closeness and brokerage position indicates a better-networked firm. Stock
return is the stock price return over one fiscal year. Sales growth is the growth in sales over one fiscal year.
ROA is net income over total assets. MTB is market value of equity over book value of equity at fiscal year
end.
matching the two databases we are unable to obtain LTIPs data for about 30% of
our Hemscott sample (mainly AIM firms). Therefore, in our primary analysis we use
the compensation data from Hemscott without LTIPs. However, we report results also
using the smaller sample with LTIP data.
There are two more reasons why excluding LTIPs from the primary analysis might
be preferable. First, because the amount of compensation that is ultimately received
from LTIPs is uncertain at the time the compensation is agreed and the LTIPs’
valuation is not straightforward. Second, because outside directors are not usually
included in LTIPs. This lacuna impairs the comparability in compensation across
director categories. We would like to maintain this comparability, since it makes
it possible for us to infer whether social networks have a differential impact on
compensation.
Table 1 provides the statistics at the firm level. The average firm closeness is 0.087
with a standard deviation of 0.049, and average firm brokerage (dyadic constraint) is
0.662 with a standard deviation of 0.226. We find that both closeness and brokerage
exhibit high levels of persistence, with first-order autocorrelations of 0.7 and 0.8,
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respectively. The average firm size is £953 million with a standard deviation of
£6,146 million. The average stock return is 16% and the average sales growth is 12%.
In contrast, the average return on assets (ROA) is negative (−4.0%), although 65% of
the observations do have a positive ROA. Average market-to-book ratio (MTB) is 2.51
and the median board has seven members.
Table 2 Panels A and B, provide the statistics by category of director.7 CEOs have the
highest average compensation of £447,000 (with LTIPs, this total rises to £577,000),
followed by other senior executives and CFOs (see Panel A).8 Chairmen of boards
have a much lower average compensation of £102,000 (with LTIPs, £88,000). Other
outside directors have an average compensation of £36,000 (with LTIPs, £32,000) (see
Panel A). The average closeness for CEOs and CFOs is 0.08 and 0.09 respectively
with a standard deviation of 0.05 and 0.047. The average CEO brokerage (one
minus the dyadic constraint) is 0.65 with a standard deviation of 0.21. Again we find
that both closeness and brokerage exhibit high levels of persistence, with first-order
autocorrelations of 0.8 and 0.9, respectively. Outside directors have moderately higher
levels of closeness and brokerage position relative to executive officers with an average
closeness of 0.1 and brokerage of 0.77 (see Panel B). The median CEO tenure is
approximately seven years, two years longer than for both CFO and other outside
directors. In addition the CEOs are more likely to have attended a top school, such
as Oxford or Cambridge etc. and obtained an MBA compared to other directors.
From the directorships in our data set, 15% also include a position on the
nomination committee, 38% on the remuneration committee, and 45% on the audit
committee. Also individuals who sit on three or more boards (busy directors) hold
17% of the directorships. Men hold 95% of directorships.
(ii) Research Design
To test whether there is an association between an executive’s and an outside director’s
compensation and her connectedness, we use the following model:
Compijt = α + β1Social Network Measureit + β2Gender i + β3Busyit
+β4Human Capital Measuresit + β5Jobijt + β6Committeeijt
+β7Firm Characteristicsjt + β8Indexjt +
44∑
I=1
γI Industryjt
+
2007∑
t=2000
γtTimeijt + εijt .
(1)
7 We note that although we obtain a director’s job classification from Hemscott, that database is not
complete, so at times it is difficult to unambiguously classify a director. For example, for some companies
the chairperson might also be the CEO of the firm. Although this is not the case (>95%) for the majority
of UK companies, we might be misclassifying some directors to other categories. However, we do not expect
this misclassification to bias our results in one direction, but rather to add noise, reducing the power of the
tests. We classify any directors as CEOs if they are both a CEO and a chairperson.
8 The average compensation with LTIPs is lower because the majority of data points are missing for the
executive officers that tend to receive the highest compensation.
C© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
410 HORTON, MILLO AND SERAFEIM
Table 2
Statistics for Compensation, Network Measures and Director Educational
Background
Measure Mean Std. Dev. Q3 Median Q1
Panel A: By Category of Executive
(1) CEO Comp (£’000) 447 634 509 258 143
Comp + LTIPs (£’000) 577 969 589 262 140
Closeness 0.083 0.049 0.118 0.103 0.069
Brokerage position 0.649 0.201 0.783 0.664 0.537
Tenure 8.200 6.000 10.000 7.000 4.000
Busy director 0.035 0.184 0.000 0.000 0.000
Gender 0.977 0.151 1.000 1.000 1.000
Top School 0.090 0.286 0.000 0.000 0.000
MBA 0.052 0.223 0.000 0.000 0.000
(2) CFO Comp (£’000) 265 309 320 174 99
Comp + LTIPs (£’000) 361 506 393 190 102
Closeness 0.085 0.047 0.118 0.104 0.078
Brokerage position 0.648 0.181 0.769 0.665 0.547
Tenure 6.300 4.500 8.000 5.000 3.000
Busy director 0.014 0.119 0.000 0.000 0.000
Gender 0.948 0.222 1.000 1.000 1.000
Top School 0.069 0.253 0.000 0.000 0.000
MBA 0.035 0.184 0.000 0.000 0.000
(3) Other Comp (£’000) 352 520 412 205 109
Executive Comp + LTIPs (£’000) 442 616 515 216 106
Closeness 0.091 0.047 0.122 0.108 0.087
Brokerage position 0.710 0.165 0.823 0.729 0.618
Tenure 6.500 4.400 8.000 5.000 3.000
Busy director 0.018 0.135 0.000 0.000 0.000
Gender 0.949 0.221 1.000 1.000 1.000
Top School 0.069 0.254 0.000 0.000 0.000
MBA 0.055 0.228 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: By Category of Outside Director
(1) Chairman Comp (£’000) 102 170 109 40 20
Comp + LTIPs (£’000) 88 127 100 40 19
Closeness 0.094 0.049 0.126 0.111 0.088
Brokerage position 0.755 0.241 0.953 0.819 0.600
Tenure 8.200 6.300 10.000 7.000 4.000
Busy director 0.309 0.462 1.000 0.000 0.000
Gender 0.985 0.121 1.000 1.000 1.000
Top School 0.026 0.159 0.000 0.000 0.000
MBA 0.007 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.000
(2) Other Outside Comp (£’000) 36 52 36 23 13
Directors Comp + LTIPs (£’000) 32 38 35 22 13
Closeness 0.100 0.044 0.127 0.114 0.096
Brokerage position 0.769 0.208 0.941 0.803 0.632
Tenure 6.400 4.700 8.000 5.000 3.000
Busy director 0.227 0.419 0.000 0.000 0.000
Gender 0.933 0.251 1.000 1.000 1.000
Top School 0.021 0.142 0.000 0.000 0.000
MBA 0.010 0.098 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 2 (Continued)
Notes:
We define compensation for each director as the sum of salary, bonus, stock options, pension benefits, and
other benefits in thousands of pounds but we exclude the long-term incentive plans. Compensation plus
LTIPs includes compensation from the long-term incentive plans. We define Closeness as the inverse of the
mean geodesic distance (i.e., the shortest path) between a vertex v and all other vertices reachable from
it. Closeness is our measure of how long it will take information to spread from a given vertex to other
reachable vertices in the network. The measure is normalized and ranges from zero to one. We measure
brokerage position by using the dyadic constraint which we minus from one. The dyadic constraint measures
the redundancy of a director’s ties. The measure is normalized and ranges from zero to one. A higher
closeness and brokerage position indicates a better-networked executive or outside director. Director tenure
is the number of years the director has been sitting on the board. Busy director is a director who serves in a
year on three or more boards. Gender is a dummy variable and has a value of one if the individual is a male
and zero if the individual is female. Top school is a dummy variable and has the value of one if the executive
attended a top university such as: Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, LSE, LBS etc. and zero otherwise. MBA is a
dummy variable and has the value of one if the executive holds a MBA qualification and zero otherwise.
Where Compijt is the natural log of the total compensation for director i, in firm j in
year t and the Social Network Measureit which is either closeness or brokerage position
for director i in year t.
We include several control variables to capture possible economic determinants
of directors’ pay. We control for the gender of the director and for whether the
director is a ‘busy’ director (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Busy directors might be better
compensated because of their high reputation or less well compensated because they
have less time to spend on each firm. By including this variable we also alleviate any
concerns that our variables capture the effect of being a busy board member. We also
include a number of controls in an attempt to capture the directors’ human capital . We
employ both informal (experience) and formal (education) human capital variables
(Cressy, 1996).9 We include the tenure and age of the director, since directors with
higher tenure and older directors are more experienced and knowledgeable, and thus
receive a relatively higher compensation (Murphy, 1999).10 The formal human capital
variables relate to the director’s educational background. In particular we control for
whether the director attended a top school.11 We also control for the level of education
achieved by the director, for example, whether the director has a PhD, or if they
have obtained an MBA and/or have any other professional qualifications such as the
chartered accountant certificate. We use the general job descriptions in Hemscott
to determine job-role fixed effects, and indicator variables that show whether an
individual sits on the nomination, remuneration, or audit committees.
In addition to these director-level characteristics variables we also, as in previous
research, control for firm-level characteristics. We use the size of the firm, calculated as
the logarithm of the market value of equity, which we expect to be positively correlated
with compensation, since larger firms are more complex and therefore require more
skilled executives (Gabaix and Landier, 2008). We measure the firm’s profitability and
9 The nationality of the directors is not included as a variable given there is no theory to suggest, both from
a human capital perspective nor a network creating perspective, that a certain nationality is better or worse
than another.
10 We note that by controlling for tenure, we are essentially biasing against our predictions, since the tenure
of a director partly reflects her social status.
11 We define top schools as Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard and the top London based universities (especially
given their proximity to the UK London business community) such as London School of Economics,
London Business School, Imperial College and University College London (UCL).
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performance by using the market-to-book (MTB) ratio, which serves as our proxy for a
firm’s growth opportunities, and we expect it to be positively related to compensation
(Smith and Watts, 1992); the return on assets (ROA); the one-year total stock price
return; and the one-year sales growth (Core et al., 2008). To capture any asymmetric
relations, we inter-act the performance controls, with indicator variables that reflect
whether the performance measures are positive or negative. We also include the
number of board members, since Yermack (1996) finds that larger boards are more
entrenched and thus are more likely to approve higher compensation packages. We
control for the firm’s London Stock Exchange Index membership (Indexjt ,), industry
membership,12 and year fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the director level
to mitigate serial and cross-directorship correlation within a director.
Given that CEO compensation has attracted considerable attention relative to other
directors, we consider CEOs separately. Likewise we also consider CFOs separately
as we believe there is relatively more homogeneity in their job role than for other
executives, thus reducing any potential noise.
To test whether there is an association between the firm’s connectedness and the
firm’s subsequent performance, we run the following model:
Performancejt,t+2 = α + β1Firm′s Social Network Measurejt−1 + β2Performancejt−1
+β3%Outsidejt + β4%Busyjt + β5Human Capital Measuresjt
+
44∑
I=1
γI Industryjt+
2007∑
t=2000
γtTimeijt + εjt . (2)
We derive the firm’s social network measure by aggregating the firm’s individual
director’s connectedness. We also assess the sensitivity of our results to this method
and construct the average director’s connectedness to obtain firm level connectedness.
The dependent variable Performancejt,t+2, is the firm performance averaged over the
subsequent one-, two- and three-year periods.13 We use three different measures of
firm performance: total stock return, market-to-book and return on assets (Core et al.,
1999). We also include as an independent variable the lag firm performance variable
Performancejt−1, to control for the endogeneity of the firm’s selection process, i.e., that
the better-performing firms choose better directors who are better-connected and as
a result provide relatively higher quality service. We therefore control for historical
factors that might be the cause for current differences in performance (Wooldridge,
2001).
We do not expect stock returns to be serially correlated, although we expect MTB
and ROA, to exhibit high persistence over time. In model 2 we also use controls
for other board characteristics that prior studies suggest are related to a firm’s
performance. We include controls for board size (Yermack, 1996), the percentage
of independent directors sitting on the board (%Outside) (Klein, 1998), and the
percentage of busy directors (%Busy) (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). In addition we also
include a number of variables to capture the director’s main human capital attributes:
12 We use five LSE index membership classifications: FTSE 100, FTSE250, FTSE350, core AIM and Fledging
AIM, and 44 industry classifications.
13 This approach is consistent with the method used in other studies (e.g., Core et al., 1999; and Hwang
and Kim, 2011).
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experience and educational attainment. We therefore include average tenure of the
directors; the proportion of directors within the firm that have been educated at a top
school and the proportion of directors that have obtained professional qualifications,
e.g., MBA, ACA, ACCA, PhD. We also control for the firm’s industry membership and
year fixed effects.
5. RESULTS
Table 3 presents the correlation matrices. Panel A is the correlation matrices for
CEOs and other executives and Panel B is the correlation matrices for chairmen
and other outside directors. For CEOs (below diagonal), we find that compensation
has a strong positive correlation with closeness (0.40) and brokerage position (0.48).
For both chairman (below diagonal) and outside directors (above diagonal), we find
the compensation has again a positive although weaker correlation with closeness
and brokerage. For example, the chairman’s compensation has a correlation with
closeness of 0.08 and with brokerage position of 0.15. For all categories of director
compensation, closeness and brokerage are positively associated with firm size, ROA,
and MTB. The human capital variables, top school, MBA, professional qualifications
are all positively correlated to compensation, closeness and brokerage, although
director tenure is weakly related to both measures of connectedness. Busy directors
have higher closeness and better brokerage positions.
Table 4 (Panels A and B) presents the results from our model 1 regression analysis.
Panel A reports the results for the executive officers and Panel B reports the results
for outside directors. Panel A, columns 1 to 4 present the results for the CEOs. In
columns 1 and 3, closeness exhibits a significant positive association with compensa-
tion. An increase of one standard deviation in closeness increases CEO compensation
by approximately £20,500 (with LTIPs, £33,000). Columns 2 and 4 show that the level
of brokerage also has a significant positive association with compensation. Compensa-
tion has no relation to gender and is negatively associated to how busy the executive
is. In unreported results, we find compensation increases with tenure and particularly
for CEOs, attending Oxford University, or having either an ACA qualification, MBA,
or PhD increases compensation. For instance, the premium for a CEO with an MBA
is 15% higher compensation, whilst for other executives (excluding CFOs) an MBA
provides 30% higher compensation. Interestingly, there is no significant premium for
CFOs with an MBA.
Because we control for factors, such as tenure, business, and committee member-
ship, that might also be influenced by networks, the economic effects from network
connections can be downward biased. When we test the same relations for CFOs, in
columns 5 and 6 our results are nearly identical to those for CEOs. For the remaining
executives we find similar results to those of CEOs and CFOs for closeness which is
positive and significantly associated to compensation. However, it does not appear that
other executives are rewarded for their brokerage position, suggesting the firm does
not find such a position in other executives useful. The coefficients are statistically
significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The results overall provide evidence
that firms compensate their executive officers according to their position in the social
network and for the reciprocating resources. A move from the 10th percentile to
the 90th percentile based on the closeness increases an executive’s compensation by
approximately 9%.
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The results for non-executive directors, reported in Table 4, Panel B, are consistent
with the executive results. We note that in this part of our analysis, if an individual is
both an executive and an outside director, then we focus only on the compensation
received from the outside directorship. For both Chairman (columns 1 to 4) and other
outside directors (columns 5 to 8) the networkmeasures are positively and significantly
associated to compensation. An increase of one standard deviation in closeness
increases outside directors’ compensation by 6%. A move from the 10th percentile
to the 90th percentile based on the brokerage position increases compensation by
approximately 10%.
Both male and more experienced outside directors earn higher compensation, but
busy directors earn lower compensation. Only Oxford University attendance and a
chartered accounting qualification appear to be significantly related to an outside
director’s compensation level. Although there is a 39% higher compensation MBA
premium for the Chairman’s position.
All these results suggest that compensation increases with an individual’s level of
connectedness. This relation could be the result of an efficient contract between the
firm and the director, or because the director is able to exercise managerial power
and extract economic rents. To distinguish between those two explanations we test the
relation between the firm’s level of connectedness and its future performance. The
results of model 2 are reported in Table 5.
We find a firm’s connectedness is associated to its future performance. Better-
connected firms have better future performance. For instance, when the dependent
variable is either the firm’s average two- or three-year future stock return, the
coefficients on the firm’s connectedness is 46.90 and 38.12 respectively, significant
at the 0.1% level and 5% level. An increase of one standard deviation in the firm’s
connectedness increases the firm’s two-year average future stock return by 4%, an
estimate that is economically significant. When the stock return is replaced with
either MTB or ROA the results are consistent. For example, when the dependent
variable is three-year average MTB the magnitude of the coefficient suggests that a
one standard deviation increase in the firm’s connectedness increases this three-year
average MTB by approximately 19 points. An increase of one standard deviation in
the firm’s connectedness variable increases ROA by approximately 0.22 points. We
find that both MTB and ROA exhibit high persistence, with coefficients ranging
from 0.53 to 0.56 and from 0.46 to 0.62 respectively, on past performance. In
contrast, stock returns indicate no persistence. These results continue to hold when
we replace the firm’s aggregate connectedness with the firm’s average connectedness
or include an additional control variable – stock return volatility – to capture firm risk,
similar to Core et al. (1999). Similarly, when we measure firm connectedness using
brokerage as opposed to closeness our results are almost identical to those reported in
Table 5. In other unreported results, we find that a firm’s performance is also positively
associated to the proportion of a firm’s directors who attended a ‘top school’.14
However, this association diminishes as the time horizon increases. For example, when
the dependent variable is the average one-year stock return the ‘top school’ coefficient
is 17.17 and significant at 0.1%, the coefficient then reduces to 7.20 when we move to
an average two-year stock return and reduces again to 3.4 when we move to an average
14 We also included as additional human capital variables, MBA, PhD and ACA attainment, however, none
of these variables were found to be robust across all specifications.
C© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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three-year stock return, neither is statistically significant. This suggests that human
capital may have a limit in determining a firm’s future success suggested by Davidsson
and Honig (2003) who find that human capital determines an individual’s entrance
into a firm, however, it does not determine an individual’s overall success once in
the firm. Similarly, Boxman et al. (1991) find human and social capital interact in
producing income, but returns on human capital decrease when there is access to
abundant social capital.
(i) Additional Analysis and Sensitivity Tests
(a) Alternative Network Measures
Instead of using the closeness and brokerage (dyadic constraint) to capture a director’s
connectedness, we investigate two alternative social network measures, betweenness
centrality and K-core, which have been used in prior social capital research. Between-
ness centrality of an individual j is defined as the ratio of the number of shortest paths
connecting two individuals, i and k, that pass through individual j and the overall
number of shortest paths that connect i and k (Freeman, 1980). This measure is
normalized and ranges from zero to one. Similar to the dyadic constraint, betweenness
captures how much information flows through a certain director, and thus the degree
to which that director can serve as a broker between pairs of other directors. K-core
is a particular area of the overall network (a sub-network) in which each director has
at least k immediate neighbours. The higher the k of a director, the better-connected
are her neighbours. Hence, she has fewer brokerage opportunities, her information is
relatively less scarce, and her actions are more constrained (Moody and White, 2003).
We divide this measure by the director’s degree. The higher the ratio, the less relative
advantage the director’s information is likely to have. When using these measures all
our results remain unchanged.
(b) LSE Compared to AIM
A potential concern is that firms listed on the LSE main market are very different
from the firms on the AIM market. By default, firms on the main market are larger
and hence more visible, and subject to stricter governance structures relative to firms
on the AIM. When we examine firms within the main market, we find that our results
are stronger for these firms compared to firms listed on the AIM. Therefore, it appears
that a director’s social network is more important for determining her compensation
when her firm is listed on the main market.
(c) Linear Relation
In addition to investigating a linear relation between a director’s connectedness and
her compensation we also investigate the possibility of a curvilinear relation. For exam-
ple, a director incurs costs to maintain her many connections (Burt, 2005) but at the
same time may receive diminishing returns from each incremental connection. Can
you be too connected? We therefore include a quadratic measure of connectedness
as an additional variable, to address these concerns. We find although the quadratic
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term is negative, consistent with the idea of diminishing returns, it is not significant,
nor does its inclusion change the previous results.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we use social network analysis to measure the connectedness of directors
within the entire director network. We find that executives’ and outside directors’ com-
pensation is associated with the characteristics of their social connections. Executive
directors, such as CEOs, CFOs, and outside directors, such as chairmen, who have
high levels of closeness and better brokerage positions earn higher compensation.
We also find evidence that these aggregate connections which generate the firm’s
connectedness are positively associated with future performance. This finding is
inconsistent with managerial power and rent-extraction by executives, and consistent
with executives receiving compensation for the resources they bring to a firm. Overall
we find on average connections are beneficial to the individual as well as to their firm.
Not all connections are bad connections.
A number of caveats apply to this study. First, as in any network study, the social
network is incomplete. Although director interlocks have been found to reflect social
ties (Hwang and Kim, 2011), we do not capture all possible avenues through which a
director can obtain an information advantage such as golf club memberships, religious
activities, political affiliations etc. Nevertheless, we believe these social or grey ties add
noise to our network estimates potentially biasing downwards the network effect we
document. Second, whilst we have tried to control for human capital and its potential
endogeneity with our social capital measures, we cannot completely rule out that
higher ability directors have a higher probability of acquiring better network positions.
However, we can take some comfort from the results of our analysis, that there appears
to be diminishing returns from a director’s human capital e.g., educational attainment
etc. in relation to future firm performance, as opposed to her social capital results.
These results are consistent with prior research. Third, as with any study of this kind,
there is a possibility of a correlated missing variable driving the results. However, we
have included numerous control variables which we think are the most likely causes of
both director pay and firm performance.
APPENDIX
Calculation of Network Measures
Closeness centrality is the inverse of the mean geodesic distance (i.e., the shortest
path) between a vertex v and all other vertices reachable from it:
Xv = N − 1N∑
w=1
u(v,w)
. (A1)
X is the closeness centrality of a vertex v in a network in which N is the number of
vertices and u(v,w) is the distance between the given vertex (v) and another vertex
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(w). Therefore, using the example of a network below C has a closeness centrality of
0.6111.
G
A
B C
H
E
D
F
I K L
J
Directors Closeness Directors Closeness 
A 0.4583 G 0.4074 
B 0.5500 H 0.3793 
C 0.6111 I 0.5500 
D 0.5000 J 0.3667 
E 0.5000 K 0.3928 
F 0.5500 L 0.2895 
This is calculated as (12 – 1) divided by the five direct ties to A, B, D, F and I with a
distance of one (1+ 1+ 1+ 1+ 1) plus the indirect ties which take a geodesic distance
of two for C to connect to E, G, H, J and K (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2) plus the geodesic
distance of three to connect to L. Thus closeness centrality is 11 divided by 18. In Pajek,
the software package we use to calculate the network measures (Batagelj and Mrvar,
2009), closeness of each individual is weighted by the total number of individuals in
the entire network. We only include the single biggest component for each year, but
the closeness measure does reflect the fact that there were other components in the
network.
‘Dyadic Constraint,’ the brokerage position, is based on Ronald Burt’s (1992)
concept of structural holes. The simplest structure in which dyadic constraint is
expressed is the triad, a fully or partially connected set of three nodes. Structures
that are more complex can be decomposed into triads. Hence, the calculation of
dyadic constraint is based on breaking down network structures to triads. Below is
the breakdown of I’s ties, from the example above:
I
F
C J
K
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.20
Breakdown of I’s ties 
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Using Pajek (de Nooy et al., 2005) we calculate the aggregate dyadic constraint
using the following dyadic constraint formula (Burt, 1992, pp.54–55):
Cij =
(
p ij +
∑
q
p iqp qj
)2
, for p = i, j (A2)
where pij is the proportion of i’s relations invested in actor j. The sum
∑
q p iqp qj is
the extent of i’s relations invested in actor q’s relations, which in turn are invested
in actor j. The total in parentheses is the proportion of i’s relations that are directly
or indirectly invested in its connections with actor j. We show the calculation of dyadic
constraint for node I. First, we calculate the value of each of the ties that a node is
part of as an inverse of its number of connections. Node I in the example above has
four ties. Hence, each of node I’s ties will have a value of 1/4, F ties will also have a
value of 1/4, and C will have a value of
1/5 and both J and K ties will have a value one
and 1/2 respectively. Second, using the values of these ties, we calculate the constraint
that each of the ties imposes on I. Since I is part of the triad C-F-I, the tie F-C is
limiting the value that I can have had from having separate connections with C and
F. Therefore, the constraint that each of these nodes imposes on I includes not only
the node’s connection with I, but also the connection between them. The constraint
on I attached to her tie with F is equal to the square of the following sum: 0.25 (I’s
investment in F), plus 0.25 × 0.2 (I’s tie to C time’s C tie to F), which equals 0.09.
Similarly, the constraint on I attached to her tie with C is equal to 0.0976 (i.e., [0.25 +
(0.25× 0.25)].2 The constraint with both J and K is just the squares of the proportional
strengths of these ties (0.0625), because there are no indirect ties from I to either J or
K. Once we have the dyadic constraint on all ties of I, we add them to obtain the
aggregate constraint. Therefore, the aggregate constraint for I is 0.3126 (i.e. 0.09 +
0.0976 + 0.0625 + 0.0625). Based on the example above I is the least constrained
director, and therefore holds the ‘best’ brokerage position within the entire network. I
connects J, K and L to the other group containing C, F, D etc. From the example above
A to F all tend to have similar information. Indeed, all the ties to D are redundant since
D can only transmit information provided by B, C, E and F, but cannot provide new
and different information.
Directors Dyadic Constraint Directors Dyadic Constraint 
A 0.7003 G 0.6427 
B 0.3875 H 0.7847 
C 0.4097 I 0.3126 
D 0.5137 J 1.0000 
E 0.4648 K 0.5000 
F 0.4597 L 1.0000 
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